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Abstract A common phenomenon in entrepreneur-
ship is that employees turn away from employment to
found their own businesses. Prior literature discusses
the former employers’ characteristics that influence
the creation of entrepreneurial ventures. An investi-
gation of whether these characteristics also affect the
success of the spawned ventures is missing so far. This
paper contributes to the literature by showing that
entrepreneurial ventures spawned by well performing
firms are financially more successful than ventures
stemming from poorly performing firms. This suggests
that spawned entrepreneurs are able to exploit valu-
able knowledge from their previous employers which
impacts their ventures’ performance positively. The
analysis is based on a linked employee–employer data
set for the Netherlands for the period 1999–2004.
Keywords Entrepreneurship  Entrepreneurial
spawning  Start-ups  Firm performance
JEL Classifications L26  M13  L25
1 Introduction
The public image of entrepreneurship is shaped by
talented individuals who lack education and work
experience but still manage to found highly successful
and world-renowned companies (Chatterji 2009).
Famous examples include Bill Gates, Steve Jobs and
Sir Richard Branson who have all become self-made
billionaires (Miller and Kroll 2010). The more realistic
view on entrepreneurship, however, is that entrepre-
neurs display significant employment histories (Coo-
per 1985; Chandler 1996). In fact, several academic
studies argue that many entrepreneurs make use of
business ideas encountered through previous employ-
ment (Klepper 2001; Agarwal et al. 2004; Klepper and
Sleeper 2005; Cassiman and Ueda 2006; Hyytinen and
Maliranta 2008).1
Accordingly, existing firms seem to be an important
driving force of entrepreneurship as many new ventures
are bred by their founders’ previous employers. This
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1 This view has been confirmed in interviews with 100 founders
of fast growing companies (Bhide´ 1994). 71% of these founders
admitted that they took advantage of a business idea they had
come across at their previous employer.
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process, by which former employees create new,
independent ventures, is referred to as ‘‘entrepreneurial
spawning’’. Although entrepreneurial spawning
appears to be a rather common and acknowledged
phenomenon (Gompers et al. 2005; Klepper and
Sleeper 2005; Garvin 1983; Cooper 1985), only a few
studies analyze the characteristics of firms that spawn
entrepreneurial ventures (Gompers et al. 2005; Hyyti-
nen and Maliranta 2008; Elfenbein et al. 2010). Rather
prominent themes within these studies deal with the
impact of firm size and performance on the rate at which
new ventures are spawned (Gompers et al. 2005;
Hyytinen and Maliranta 2008; Franco and Filson 2006;
Elfenbein et al. 2010). Especially large firms are often
argued to have high spawning rates. An explanation
could be that employees start new ventures because
they become frustrated that the entrepreneurial oppor-
tunities they identify are constantly rejected by their
employers (Gompers et al. 2005). Small firms, in
contrast, are assumed to equip their employees with the
necessary skills for founding new ventures which is
reflected in increased spawning rates (Elfenbein et al.
2010). Regarding firm performance, two opposing
views can be brought forward as well. Whereas less
successful firms could spawn more new ventures
because the opportunity costs for employees to leave
the firm are low, well performing firms might have high
spawning rates as employees become exposed to more
entrepreneurial opportunities (Gompers et al. 2005).
A shortcoming in the current literature on entrepre-
neurial spawning, however, is that the link between the
characteristics of the spawning firms (the former
employers) and the success of the newly spawned
ventures is insufficiently discussed (Gompers et al.
2005; Cassiman and Ueda 2006; Klepper and Thomp-
son 2010). Of particular interest is the question whether
successful firms also spawn successful ventures. It can
be assumed that better performing firms provide an
excellent learning environment for their employees,
resulting in the creation of more successful ventures
(Klepper 2007; Boschma and Wenting 2007). In this
paper, we address this gap in the entrepreneurship
literature and scrutinize if a positive relationship
between venture performance and spawning firm
performance exists. Information that helps predict the
success or the default risk of young ventures is useful
for banks, investors and credit suppliers. Especially
young and small firms typically face financial con-
straints (Denis 2004), but also greater difficulties in
accessing funds than their larger and older counterparts
since it is more difficult for the lender or investor to
assess the ‘‘quality’’ of these firms (Harhoff and
Koerting 1998). If characteristics of the former
employer help determine the success of new ventures
this is of interest for potential external capital providers
who can facilitate capital access for young and small
ventures.
Our empirical analysis is based on the official
employee–employer data sets of Statistics Netherlands
for the years 1999–2005. The data set covers all
manufacturing and service sectors. Since most previous
studies on the determinants of entrepreneurial spawn-
ing focus on specific sectors (e.g. Agarwal et al. 2004;
Klepper and Sleeper 2005; Franco and Filson 2006;
Chatterji 2009) or on samples that are selected accord-
ing to specific criteria (e.g. only publicly listed venture-
capital backed spawned ventures, see Gompers et al.
2005; or only on spawned ventures created by entre-
preneurs with a degree in science or engineering, see
Elfenbein et al. 2010) we make use of the rich
information we have and re-investigate the effect of
firm size and performance on the rate at which new
ventures are spawned in the Netherlands. Our results for
a sample that covers the most important industries and
various types of spawned ventures largely confirm the
findings of a previous study for the United States
(Gompers et al. 2005), as we show that large firms are
the most active spawners. Furthermore, financially
successful firms are found to spawn fewer ventures than
unsuccessful firms. In the second step, we contribute to
the literature by investigating a more novel research
question, namely, whether the spawning firms’ charac-
teristics have an effect on the ventures’ performance.
We find that being spawned by successful firms has a
positive impact on the financial performance of the new
ventures. This suggests that venture founders who
worked at well performing firms have gathered more
valuable knowledge about founding and running new
businesses successfully than founders previously
employed by less successful companies.
Our analysis contributes to the literature on entre-
preneurial spawning in the following ways. First, to
our knowledge, we are the first to study the effect of
the spawning firms’ characteristics on the ventures’
financial performance.2 Second, our data set
2 There are only two previous studies investigating the link
between venture performance and the characteristics of the
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encompasses a broad variety of spawning firms and
newly spawned ventures. This means that our data is
neither restricted to publicly listed spawning firms nor
to newly spawned ventures that are venture capital
backed (cf. Gompers et al. 2005). The data set further
covers entrepreneurial spawning in all manufacturing
and service industries so that our study is not limited to
one specific industry sector as in Agarwal et al. (2004)
or Klepper and Sleeper (2005).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
In the next section, the existing literature on entrepre-
neurial spawning is reviewed. Afterwards, we describe
our data set and present the econometric results. The
final section concludes.
2 Theory and research questions
Since entrepreneurial spawning has received increas-
ing attention in the academic literature, scholars
became interested in the characteristics of firms that
breed new ventures. Two recurring characteristics
within most studies are firm size and firm performance
(Gompers et al. 2005; Hyytinen and Maliranta 2008;
Elfenbein et al. 2010). Up until now, however, the
empirical findings vary across different industry
sectors and countries. Whereas some studies observe
a negative relationship between firm size and spawn-
ing rate (Hyytinen and Maliranta 2008, for Finland’s
manufacturing and service industries; Elfenbein et al.
2010, for spawned ventures in the United States that
are founded by entrepreneurs with a science or
engineering degree), Gompers et al. (2005) report a
positive relationship for venture capital backed
spawned ventures in the United States. Ambiguous
findings also exist for the implications of performance
on the rate at which new ventures are spawned.
Gompers et al. (2005) discover that less successful
firms spawn more ventures whereas Franco and Filson
(2006) find no significant result for the U.S. disk drive
industry. Previous literature provides theoretical argu-
ments for these different empirical results.
Large and bureaucratic firms are often argued to
feature high spawning rates for a variety of reasons.
Gompers et al. (2005) summarize these reasons and
refer to them as the ‘‘Xerox view’’3 of entrepreneurial
spawning. First of all, unlike industry entrants,
incumbent companies may be unable to adapt to
radical technological change because their existing
capabilities and routines are too inflexible (Tripsas and
Gavetti 2000; Sull 1999; Tushman and Anderson
1986). Henderson (1993) shows in her study on the
photolithographic industry that incumbent firms are
less productive than industry entrants at introducing
radical technologies because of their outdated organi-
zational capabilities. Such circumstances can induce
creative and entrepreneurial employees to leave the
firm and start their own ventures, where they can
freely implement new ideas. A second reason for high
spawning rates within large companies is that manag-
ers are incapable of evaluating and implementing
entrepreneurial opportunities—as identified by
employees—that are not within the firms’ core lines
of business (Gompers et al. 2005; Klepper and Sleeper
2005, for the U.S. medical devises industry). Because
managers lack the knowledge to make an informed
decision about an unrelated entrepreneurial opportu-
nity, they tend to dismiss it. Similarly, established
companies could make a deliberate choice to leave out
on entrepreneurial opportunities which are not in line
with their core competencies. In this case, the decision
to neglect employees’ entrepreneurial opportunities is
not driven by organizational inefficiencies but by the
conviction that remaining a focused firm is more value
enhancing than being a diversified firm (Berger and
Ofek 1995). Accordingly, incumbents can act quite
rigidly as they purposely forego profitable entrepre-
neurial opportunities for reasons of strategic commit-
ment (Hellmann 2007). All arguments of the Xerox
view suggest that employees start new ventures
because they are frustrated that the entrepreneurial
opportunities they identified are not capitalized on by
their employers (Gompers et al. 2005; Hellmann 2007;
Garvin 1983; Klepper 2001).
But not only large firms are considered as potential
incubators for entrepreneurial ventures. Some studies
Footnote 2 continued
spawning companies (Franco and Filson 2006; Eriksson and
Kuhn 2006). Both studies, however, employ a survival based
performance measure, while we focus on the ventures’ financial
performance.
3 Gompers et al. (2005) term this view the Xerox view because
Xerox is exemplary for a large, incumbent firm that had to deal
with the departure of several employees who founded their own
ventures.
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report a negative relationship between firm size and
spawning rate (Dobrev and Barnett 2005; Elfenbein
et al. 2010; Sørensen 2007). Small firms can be active
spawners because employees benefit from essential
information on how to found new businesses. Relative
to employees of large firms employees of small firms
are granted superior access to valuable outside
networks with customers and suppliers (Elfenbein
et al. 2010; Wagner 2004; Eriksson and Kuhn 2006).
Such network ties can be particularly useful when
starting entrepreneurial ventures. Employees of small
firms are also not bound to specialize on a single task.
Instead, they can develop skills in a vast range of
business related activities (Dobrev and Barnett 2005;
Elfenbein et al. 2010; Cooper 1985). Lazear (2004,
2005) argues that successful entrepreneurs need to be
‘‘jacks-of-all-trades’’ and possess a balanced set of
skills. Hence, small firms seem to provide the perfect
organizational environment for employees to develop
such sets of diversified skills, leading to higher rates of
entrepreneurial spawning (cf. Sørensen 2007; Elfen-
bein et al. 2010). The reasons presented above suggest
that small firms shape their employees and provide
them with the necessary skills, knowledge and
contacts that could drive them into entrepreneurship
eventually (Elfenbein et al. 2010).
It is also possible though that small firms breed new
ventures because risk seeking individuals tend to self-
select into such firms (Gompers et al. 2005; Sørensen
2007). Working for smaller firms is risky since,
compared to large firms, wages are more variable
(Parker 2006; Elfenbein et al. 2010) and the likelihood
of firm exits in the first years is high (Wagner 1994).
There is evidence that less risk averse people start
working in small companies and do not hesitate to turn
to entrepreneurship once they spot a valuable business
opportunity (Elfenbein et al. 2010). Accordingly,
individuals preferring to work for small firms might
be those with a preference for becoming self-
employed all along. A final reason is related to the
salaries paid in small firms. Usually, employees in
small firms receive lower salaries than individuals
working for larger companies (see Elfenbein et al.
2010, and the references therein). Consequently, the
opportunity costs for leaving the employer and
founding a new venture are significantly lower.
Based on these two perspectives it becomes obvi-
ous that the theoretical literature as well as the
empirical evidence lack a clear standpoint whether a
positive or negative relationship between size and
spawning rate exists. On the one hand, employees of
large firms could start new ventures because they are
frustrated that the entrepreneurial opportunities they
would like to pursue are hardly implemented by their
employers. On the other hand, employees of small
firms could become entrepreneurs because they have
gathered the necessary know-how from their previous
employers. Hence, the following research question
arises:
RQ1 What effect does firm size have on the rate at
which new ventures are spawned?
In a similar vein, the theoretical arguments for the
relationship between employer performance and
spawning rate are ambiguous. Irrespective of the
employer’s size, the employee’s opportunity costs for
starting a new venture are also low if the performance
of the employer is weak. Most empirical studies
confirm that employees who work at an unsuccessful
firm turn to entrepreneurship because the rents from
remaining employed are small (Gompers et al. 2005;
Hyytinen and Maliranta 2008). Eriksson and Kuhn
(2006) characterize ventures emerging from unsuc-
cessful firms to be ‘‘pushed’’ as they are a reaction to
unfavorable conditions at the spawning firms.
Alternatively, a firm could spawn more entrepre-
neurial ventures if its performance is high. This
argument is based on the fact that employees working
at a financially viable firm are assumed to be exposed
to more entrepreneurial opportunities (Gompers et al.
2005; Franco and Filson 2006), which they could
pursue as self-employed individuals. Such ventures
are ‘‘pulled’’ by the market as employees would only
leave a profitable firm if the returns from the perceived
entrepreneurial opportunity are high enough (Eriksson
and Kuhn 2006).
Since existing research suggests that the relation-
ship between firm performance and spawning rate
could either be positive or negative, the second
research question reads as follows:
RQ2 What effect does firm performance have on the
rate at which new ventures are spawned?
As previous literature mainly focuses on the
determinants of entrepreneurial spawning, Gompers
et al. (2005) suggest examining whether the spawning
firms’ characteristics can affect the success of the new
ventures. In particular, they probe the question if
914 J. M. H. Dick et al.
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ventures of successful spawning companies turn out to
be successful as well. This positive relationship could
be based on the quality of knowledge that founders of
newly spawned ventures have learnt from their
previous employers. Previous research has shown that
nascent entrepreneurs can acquire useful knowledge
about technologies (Klepper and Sleeper 2005; Agar-
wal et al. 2004), markets (Jovanovic 1982; Agarwal
et al. 2004) and organizational processes (Buenstorf
2009) during their employment phases. Since suc-
cessful companies have accumulated a rich knowledge
base (Klepper and Sleeper 2005; Klepper 2001), it can
be assumed that ventures originating from such firms
have superior initial knowledge endowments as com-
pared to ventures of less successful spawning compa-
nies. In other words, depending on their origin, some
ventures have a knowledge advantage at birth, which
can have long-lasting effects on their performance
(Agarwal et al. 2004; Chatterji 2009; Klepper and
Sleeper 2005; Stinchcombe 1965). This implies that
ventures which have been spawned by successful
companies are likely to be successful themselves (cf.
Klepper and Thompson 2010; Klepper 2001; Cassi-
man and Ueda 2006). In addition to the learning
argument, ventures spawned by successful firms turn
out to be successful because, as was described before,
employees are only tempted to become entrepreneurs
if the perceived entrepreneurial opportunity is of high
quality and promises high returns (Eriksson and Kuhn
2006).
So far, the only empirical evidence on the relation-
ship between the performance of former employers
and spawned ventures is provided by Franco and
Filson (2006) and Eriksson and Kuhn (2006). Using
data from the disk drive industry, Franco and Filson
(2006) conclude that ventures of successful spawning
companies turn out to be successful as well. Instead of
using financial measures, however, they rely on the
ventures’ life span to approximate performance.
Eriksson and Kuhn (2006) conduct a similar analysis
and find that ventures of firms which stopped their
operations have lower survival probabilities than
ventures of ‘‘healthy’’ firms. A drawback of survival
measures is that they assume a strong correlation
between economic performance and survival. This
assumption is, in particular, questionable when firm
exit includes acquisitions and IPOs. Gimeno et al.
(1997) further argue that performance is not the sole
determinant of survival. Firms’ exit decision is the
decision of the entrepreneur so that given the same
level of (under-)performance some firms decide to exit
while others do not. All previous studies dealing with
the relationship between venture performance and
spawning firm performance are subject to this limita-
tion (Franco and Filson 2006; Eriksson and Kuhn
2006). This paper circumvents this limitation by
employing financial performance measures to analyze
if there is a positive relationship between spawning
firm success and venture success. Therefore, the final
research question reads as follows:
RQ3 Is there a positive relationship between the
financial performance of the spawning firm and the
financial performance of the venture?
3 Data
The empirical analysis relies on data sets provided by
Statistics Netherlands. Statistics Netherlands offers a
rich set of information as it stores a variety of
administrative registers, like employment statistics,
self-employment statistics, financial statements for
large and small firms and detailed firm level informa-
tion (including firm location and firm age) for all firms
in the Netherlands. All of these data sets contain
unique employer and employee identifiers so that they
can be linked to each other.
In order to answer our three research questions we
construct two data sets. By means of the first database,
we investigate the firm attributes affecting spawning
rates. Hence, this database constitutes a sample of
spawning firms and a control group of non-spawning
firms. The second database is required to analyze if the
ventures’ performance is influenced by the character-
istics of their spawning firms. The unit of analysis is
therefore the spawned venture. The next two subsec-
tions describe in detail how both databases were
compiled.
3.1 Database 1: the spawner data set
Statistics Netherlands keeps track of the whole
working population of the Netherlands. They not only
observe individuals who are employed at companies
but also hold information on self-employed individ-
uals. The unit of observation in both data sources is the
individual who can be linked to the company for which
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she works or, in case of self-employment, the venture
she owns. Merging both data sets allows us to identify
individuals who have been employed and then left
their employers to start spawned ventures.4 By means
of this information on the level of the individual, we
identify the aggregate number of ventures a particular
employer has spawned per year.5 We can then relate
these annual spawning levels to a set of detailed firm
level characteristics from the General Business Reg-
ister and their financial statements provided by
Statistics Netherlands.
We restrict our sample to spawning firms from
manufacturing and service industries. Furthermore,
we exclude firms from the construction sector as this
industry displays an unusually high rate of newly
spawned ventures. A likely explanation is that the
Dutch construction sector is characterized by ‘‘bogus
self-employment’’, which means that contractors dis-
guise their workers’ employment status as self-
employed, as this exempts them from paying national
work disability insurance contributions, which are
relatively high in the construction sector (Vandenheu-
vel and Wooden 1997).
In total, we identify 19,895 spawning firms for
which we have access to their financial performance
that have spawned 26,010 ventures during the period
1999 to 2004.6 Table 9 in Appendix 2 shows the
spawning frequency per firm. The majority of the firms
in our sample (85%) spawn only one venture in the
period of interest while only a few firms spawn more
than six ventures.
Since we want to scrutinize if certain firm charac-
teristics (firm size and performance, in particular)
increase the rates at which new ventures are spawned
and the likelihood of spawning at the firm level, we
drew a random sample of 10% of the non-spawning
firms in our sample.7 A random sample was chosen
because we want to investigate the determinants of
spawning and, hence, do not want to condition the
control group on certain firm characteristics. This
control group of non-spawning companies contains of
28,320 firms. In total, the data set contains 122,272
firm-year observations of Dutch manufacturing and
service firms. A total of 43% (52,597) of these
observations are spawning firms in the sense that they
have spawned at least one venture in the period from
1999 to 2004. Table 10 in Appendix 2 shows the
distribution of spawning and non-spawning firms
across the different industries. The sectors with the
highest spawning intensities are electricity, gas and
water supply, manufacturing of chemicals and chem-
ical products, manufacturing of pulp, paper and paper
products and manufacturing of food products, bever-
ages and tobacco. Table 11 in Appendix 2 shows the
panel structure of the sample.
The following subsections describe the variables
that are used for the empirical analysis and provide
descriptive statistics for spawners and non-spawners.
3.1.1 Variables: the spawner data set
As indicated above, the dependent variable of our
analysis is the annual number of ventures that an
employer has spawned (Spawning Rate).
Our main independent variables are size and
performance of spawners and, given our control
group, non-spawners. As in Gompers et al. (2005),
our measure of firm size is total assets.8 Since the asset
distribution is skewed across firms, we employ the
logarithm of total assets (Size). Firm performance is
measured by both annual growth in sales (Sales
Growth) and return on assets (ROA). The latter
performance variable is calculated as net income over
total assets.
In addition, we use a number of control variables:
we include the companies’ total wage bill in our
regression models. As it can be assumed that the
4 We allow for a gap of one year between employment and self-
employment. This accounts for the fact that the transition
process from employment to self-employment is not always
smooth. It seems improbable that an employee quits her job in 1
month and has her own venture in the same or the following
month already. Furthermore, our database only contains of first-
time entrepreneurs. Serial entrepreneurs have been eliminated,
which is consistent with Gompers et al. (2005).
5 We define a spawning company as the last employer an
entrepreneur has worked for although she could have had
multiple previous jobs. This definition is also consistent with
Gompers et al. (2005).
6 We can only analyze spawning rates in this time frame since
the self-employment statistics and the employment statistics are
unavailable before 1999.
7 Firms in the control group did not engage in entrepreneurial
spawning during the whole period of interest.
8 Note that employment as an alternative measure was not
available to us since the data sets only provide firm size classes.
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‘‘quality’’ of human capital is positively related to
wage, we use this variable as a proxy for the skill
composition of the spawning firms’ labor force
(Griliches 1969; Devine 1994; Arnold and Hussinger
2005). Since the total wage bill of a firm is typically
highly correlated with its size, we normalize this
variable by our firm size measure. This variable is
labeled Average Wage in the remainder of the paper.
Furthermore, some firms decide to remain undiversi-
fied regarding their business activities and refuse
exploring unrelated business opportunities. As a
result, entrepreneurial employees may decide to leave
the firm and start their own ventures. To control for
this, we introduce a dummy variable that takes the
value one for firms that are active in only one industry
segment and zero otherwise (Focused).
We also account for the age of spawners and non-
spawners in our regression models (Age). Since
several studies have reported that especially young
firms have a tendency to spawn new ventures (Gom-
pers et al. 2005; Dobrev and Barnett 2005; Wagner
2004), we add a dummy variable that equals one if a
spawning firm is five years old or younger and zero
otherwise (Young). Firm age is censored at 37 years in
our database. The reason is that Statistics Netherlands
only started its data collection process in 1967. Firms
that already existed before this year are treated as if
they were founded in 1967. To account for this data
limitation in our empirical specifications, we create a
dummy variable, which takes the value one if a firm is
37 years of age—according to the Statistics Nether-
lands information—and zero otherwise (Old).
Several studies find that certain regions are more
likely to prompt entrepreneurship (Venkataraman
2004; Audretsch 2005, 2007a, b; Malecki 1994). This
result is attributed to the fact that entrepreneurship
capital, which forms the capacity for entrepreneurial
activity, differs within regions. Entrepreneurship cap-
ital refers to a broad spectrum of legal, institutional
and social factors (Audretsch 2007a). In order to
account for the fact that different regions might have
different levels of entrepreneurial capital, we add 12
region dummies corresponding to the 12 officially
recognized regions that exist in the Netherlands (see
Table 12 in Appendix 2). Finally, we create 34
industry dummies based on the 2-digit NACE industry
classification (see Table 10 in Appendix 2) and
include 6 year dummies that control for business
cycle effects.
3.1.2 Descriptive statistics: the spawner data set
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for our sample of
spawning firms and the control group of non-spawning
firms. All financial variables are measured in thou-
sands of Euros.
The descriptive statistics reveal that, on average, a
spawning firm breeds roughly 2.21 ventures over the
analyzed period of 6 years. This corresponds to an
average of 0.39 spawned ventures per year. Compar-
ing spawners with non-spawners shows that the former
are, on average, almost four years older than the latter.
Spawning firms are also much larger than non-
spawning firms. This is reflected in the significantly
higher average asset level. However, non-spawning
firms significantly outperform spawning firms in terms
of ROA. There is no significant difference regarding
the sales growth of spawning and non-spawning firms.
Finally, spawning companies pay significantly higher
average wages than non-spawning companies and are
also less likely to be diversified.
3.2 Database 2: the venture data set
Creating a database that allows us to scrutinize if
venture performance is affected by the characteristics
of their spawning companies involves three steps.
First, we need to link financial information to our
identified set of spawned ventures. Statistics Nether-
lands provides financial information for a stratified
sample of firms which are obliged to pay corporate
taxes. About 80% of the total population of these firms
is sampled by Statistics Netherlands. Since most of the
spawned ventures are one-person businesses and
exempted from corporate taxation, financial informa-
tion is not available for them.9 As a result, our sample
contains 438 ventures that are subject to corporate
taxes. The 438 ventures correspond to 637 venture-
year observations, which define our final venture
sample.
In a second step, non-financial information is linked
to these ventures. By means of this information, we are
able to assess the ventures’ age as well as their regional
and industry affiliations. The final step is to link our
subset of ventures back to their spawning companies.
9 Examples of such ventures that are not subject to corporate
taxation are one-man consulting businesses and independent
sales agents.
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This reveals that the 438 ventures have been spawned
by 413 firms during the period 2000–2005.10 Since our
ventures stem from spawning firms in manufacturing
or services, most ventures start operating in these
sectors as well. Only 10% become active in non-
manufacturing or non-service industries.11
In the next subsection, the variables that are used
for the empirical analysis are described.
3.2.1 Variables: the venture data set
We examine the ventures’ performance by consider-
ing two different performance measures. The first one
is the ventures’ returns on assets (V_ROA). This
measure has been frequently used in studies on the
performance of young and small ventures (e.g.
Murphy et al. 1996; Robinson 1999). Since ROA
could be influenced by differences in capital structure
or dividend policies across firms, we also use operat-
ing returns on assets (V_OROA) as a second perfor-
mance measure. OROA is calculated as the ratio of
earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) to total
assets and is a widely accepted performance measure
(cf. Bennedsen et al. 2007; Hvide 2010). The fact that
our sample is highly unbalanced (most of the ventures
are only observed once) does not allow us to use
growth measures as dependent variables since we
would lose most of our observations.12
The same firm characteristics that have been used
for our spawning companies are also used for the
ventures. We control for the size of the ventures by
taking the logarithm of total assets (V_Size). The
quality of the ventures’ labor force is accounted for by
the average wage (V_Average Wage). We also control
for the age of the ventures (V_Age). Since some
ventures are founded by more than one entrepreneur,
we incorporate a dummy variable that takes the value
one if ventures have been established by founding
teams and zero otherwise (Founding Team).13 Fur-
thermore, ventures that are active in the same industry
as their spawning companies might be more success-
ful than others as they are more familiar with the
industry conditions. To control for this possibility,
Table 1 Descriptive statistics: spawner data set
Variables Spawner (N = 52,597) Non-spawner (N = 69,675) Mean difference t
Mean SD Mean SD
Total spawning 2.21 11.85 – – – –
Spawning Rate 0.39 2.26 – – – –
Size 7.51 1.91 6.29 1.42 1.22 130.00***
ROA 0.04 0.19 0.05 0.22 -0.01 -3.81***
Sales Growth 0.02 0.35 0.02 0.39 0.00 -0.89
Age 18.53 11.63 14.75 11.25 3.78 57.26***
Young 0.16 0.002 0.27 0.002 -0.11 -46.45***
Old 0.03 0.18 0.02 0.14 0.01 16.05***
Average Wage 0.49 0.41 0.41 0.37 0.08 38.19***
Focused 0.36 0.48 0.21 0.41 0.15 57.77***
Note: Industry dummies, year dummies and region dummies are omitted; *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%),
respectively
10 The time frame of the analysis for the spawner database is the
period 1999–2004. We loose the year 2005 since we allow for a
1 year gap when defining our spawned ventures. For the venture
database, we focus on the period 2000–2005. We lose the first
year for this data set as it is not possible to observe the previous
employment situation of entrepreneurs who founded new
ventures in 1999.
11 An alternative set up would be to compare spawned ventures
with a control group of ventures that have been established by
entrepreneurs without any employment histories. Given our
short observation period of 5 years, we decided to not follow this
approach as we cannot determine whether the founders of the
ventures within our potential control group have not been
employed by a company prior to the designated time period.
12 Note that our 5-years sample does not allow us to conduct a
meaningful survival analysis. Only 16 ventures exit in the period
2000–2005.
13 It is important to note that all members of the founding team
must have been employed prior to the foundation of the new
ventures if the variable takes the value one.
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we add a dummy variable that takes the value one if
ventures and spawners are in the same industry and
zero otherwise (Same Industry). Lastly, we include six
industry and four region dummies for both spawned
ventures and spawning companies.14
Besides these venture characteristics, the data
set allows us to control for the attributes of the
spawning firms. These spawning firm attributes have
been described in Sect. 3.1.1. The performance of
spawning companies—measured by ROA and Sales
Growth—is most important for our empirical analysis
as we want to analyze if successful firms also spawn
successful ventures.
3.2.2 Descriptive statistics: the venture data set
Our final sample consists of 637 ventures observations
and their respective spawning companies. Table 2
shows descriptive statistics of this sample.15 As
before, all financial variables are measured in
thousands of Euros.
The results show that the average ROA (V_ROA) of
spawned ventures is considerably lower than the
average OROA (V_OROA). This shows that tax and
interest payments account for a large share of the
ventures’ returns. The average age of the ventures in
the sample is 2.5 years. It can also be seen that most
ventures were founded by individual entrepreneurs.
Only 2% were created by founding teams. Further-
more, 26% of the ventures remain in the same industry
as their parent companies.
If one compares the spawning firms in the venture
database with the spawning companies of the previous
database containing all spawning firms in the Nether-
lands in our period of interest, several differences can be
observed. First of all, the spawning companies in this
data set, i.e. those that spawn ventures which are subject
to corporate taxation, are, on average, larger and
younger. In terms of performance, the spawning firms’
average ROA and average sales growth have decreased.
This should be kept in mind for the interpretation of the
results. If it would be the case that we have a positive
selection of ventures that are spawned by more success-
ful parents we would underestimate the effect of the
former employer’s success on the venture success.
4 Econometric results
In the following subsections, we present the empirical
results for our three research questions. We start in
Sect. 4.1 by analyzing the effect of, inter alia, firm size
and performance on the rate at which new ventures are
spawned. Section 4.2 in turn is concerned with the
relationship between spawning firm characteristics
(the spawning firms’ performance in particular) and
venture performance.
4.1 Which firm characteristics influence
the Spawning Rate?
As mentioned above, we consider the annual number
of newly spawned ventures as the dependent variable
Table 2 Descriptive statistics: venture data set
Variables N = 637
Mean SD Min Max
V_ROA 0.003 0.22 -1 0.58
V_OROA 0.04 0.20 -0.93 0.62
V_Size 5.53 1.42 0.69 9.49
V_Age 2.58 1.74 0 5
V_Average Wage 0.32 0.36 0 1.97
V_Founding Team 0.02 0.14 0 1
Size 8.79 3.23 1.39 17.43
ROA 0.01 0.17 -0.29 1
Sales Growtha -0.016 0.21 -0.56 0.94
Age 15.11 10.57 1 37
Young 0.23 0.42 0 1
Old 0.022 0.15 0 1
Average Wage 0.41 0.40 0 1.97
Focused 0.94 0.23 0 1
Same Industry 0.26 0.44 0 1
Note: Industry dummies, year dummies and region dummies
are omitted for both ventures and spawners
a Since we lose 1 year in creating the sales growth variable, we
only end up with 426 observations
14 Note that for the venture sample we use more aggregated
regions and industries, based on the 2-digit NACE level, than for
the spawner sample because of the smaller sample size.
15 All variables starting with a ‘‘V’’ are venture characteristics.
The same variables without the ‘‘V’’ account for spawning
firms’ characteristics.
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(Spawning Rate). Since this variable only contains
positive integers and zeros, count data models are
applied. Two types of count data models are estimated,
namely, Poisson models and negative binomial mod-
els. Likelihood ratio tests for the null hypothesis of
equidispersion show, however, that Poisson models
are always rejected. As a result, only negative
binomial models are presented.16 Since firms do not
spawn new ventures every year and since our sample
also includes a control group of non-spawning firms,
the dependent variable consists of many zero counts
(74.5%). We account for this by also estimating zero-
inflated negative binomial models. In order to test if
the zero-inflated negative binomial models outper-
form the standard negative binomial models, Vuong
tests are performed for all model specifications. All
Vuong test statistics reveal that the zero inflated
models fit the data better than the standard models.17
Nevertheless, we always report both zero-inflated
negative binomial models and standard negative
binomial models. Standard errors are clustered on
the firm level since some of the ventures are observed
more often than once.18 The results are presented in
Table 3. Table 4 shows the marginal effects for the
main variables.
The first two columns of Table 3 (Models 1 and 2)
provide estimation results for the full sample of
spawning firms and the control group of non-spawning
firms. Both the zero inflated negative binomial model
and the regular negative binomial model provide
similar results. First of all, it can be seen that large
companies have high spawning rates. It makes sense
that large firms spawn more given that there are more
people and technologies that could spark the ideas for
new ventures. The positive size effect remains robust
if we estimate Tobit models (Models 6 and 7) in which
the dependent variable is the annual number of
spawned ventures normalized by total assets.19 Our
first research question formulates a relationship
between firm size and spawning rates. Based on the
described result, it can now be concluded that large
firms spawn more frequently than smaller firms,
providing support for the Xerox view as suggested
by Gompers et al. (2005). The size of the effects is
significant. If the assets of a firm increase by 1% the
firms spawns 0.04 additional new ventures (Model 1).
In other words, if an average spawning firm’s assets
(7.51) increase by one standard deviation (1.91), i.e.
by 25%, the firm spawns one more venture. The
coefficient estimates of the two performance variables
(Sales Growth and ROA) in Models 1 and 2 are
significantly negative. By referring back to our second
research question, this implies that financially unsuc-
cessful firms spawn more ventures than successful
firms (cf. Gompers et al. 2005; Eriksson and Kuhn
2006; Hyytinen and Maliranta 2008). One could
explain this finding by arguing that the opportunity
costs for staying at bad performing firms are high,
leading employees to found their own entrepreneurial
ventures. Table 4 shows that the economic effect of
performance is rather small. If a firm’s return on assets
increases by one unit it will spawn 0.03 ventures less.
The marginal effect for sales growth is rather small as
well. This suggests that the effect of firm size is more
important than the effect of firm success.
Regarding the control variables, the results reveal
that firms have a tendency to spawn new ventures
when they are young, as indicated by the significantly
negative coefficient of the Age variable. This result is
consistent with studies by Dobrev and Barnett (2005)
and Gompers et al. (2005). A likely explanation is that
young firms are usually characterized by higher
uncertainty and informational asymmetries (Gompers
and Lerner 2001; Bates 2005). Hence, employees
working for such firms might found their own ventures
to forestall layoffs. Another possible explanation for
our finding could be that aging firms are likely to shift
their strategic focus from product innovations to
process innovations. Such a strategic change could
cause the character of the firms’ knowledge to become
embodied in physical rather than human capital,
16 The Poisson estimates revealed the same results as the
negative binomial models and are available from the authors
upon request.
17 Vuong test statistics are reported at the bottom of Table 3.
18 The results are robust if we cluster the standard errors on the
industry or regional level.
19 We run Tobit regressions because the dependent variable
does not consist of integer values anymore and is truncated at
zero. Not only does the firm size coefficient display a similar
magnitude and direction as in the count data estimations, also
the other main results remain comparable. The marginal effects
Footnote 19 continued
for age, size, ROA, and sales growth vary by not more than 0.01
across the different models. The marginal effect for the average
wage shows the highest variation across the different models
with 0.04.
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making it harder for employees to access the firms’
key knowledge and found entrepreneurial ventures
(Klepper and Sleeper 2005; Garvin 1983).
Another interesting result is that firms paying high
average wages also have high spawning rates (Average
Wage). Since our wage variable is taken as a proxy for
the skill composition of a firm’s labor force it can be
concluded that qualified employees are more likely to
generate more good ideas, which some may decide to
exploit without their current employer. Finally, year
dummies, industry dummies and region dummies are
jointly significant throughout all two regression mod-
els, as Wald tests at the bottom of Table 3 show.
As many studies on the transition process from
employment to self employment focus on firms from
high tech industries (Klepper and Sleeper 2005;
Table 3 Count data results and Tobit results on the annual Spawning Rate for the full sample and the high tech subsample











Sample Full sample High tech
sample
Full sample High tech
sample
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Size 0.52*** 0.52*** 0.55*** 0.55*** 0.02*** 0.01**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06) (0.006)
ROA -0.43*** -0.43*** -0.46*** -0.54*** -0.03*** -0.02**
(0.07) (0.06) (0.12) (0.12) (0.07) (0.09)
Sales Growth -0.16*** -0.14*** -0.02 -0.01 -0.06*** 0.001
(0.04) (0.03) (0.08) (0.08) (0.02) (0.003)
Age -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01** -0.01** -0.001** -0.001*
(0.001) (0.01) (0.004) (0.004) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Young -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 -0.08 0.000 -0.004
(0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.09) (0.02) (0.003)
Old 0.16 0.19** -0.06 -0.04 0.07 -0.002
(0.10) (0.09) (0.38) (0.37) (0.05) (0.01)
Average Wage 0.91*** 1.13*** 1.11*** 1.12*** 0.06*** 0.03**
(0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.02) (0.01)
Focused -0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.003 0.006** 0.003
(0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.08) (0.02) (0.003)
Intercept -8.04*** -8.39*** -8.69*** -8.64*** -0.44*** -0.27**
(0.13) (0.09) (0.32) (0.34) (0.13) (0.11)
Joint significance of year
dummies, v2(4)
1055.71*** 1925.29*** 252.71*** 251.31*** 3.61*** 1.78
Joint significance of industry
dummies, v2(33)
388.67*** 434.55*** 18.32**,b 17.61**,b 0.6 0.69b
Joint significance of region
dummies, v2(11)
123.32*** 145.83*** 19.59* 19.16* 1.13 0.44
Log-likelihood -41250.03 -41472.61 -3819.47 -3828.25 -8387.29 -127.91
Vuong test statistic 10.39*** – 3.15*** – – –
Observations 122272 122272 11553 11553 122272 11553
Notes: Clustered standard errors at the firm level are in parentheses; *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%),
respectively
a The inflation equation includes the same variables as the logit equation (coefficient estimates are not reported)
b Test of joint significance of industry dummies, v2(8)
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Agarwal et al. 2004; Chatterji 2009), we re-run our
regression models for a subset of firms from high tech
sectors (Models 3 and 4).20 This reduces the sample to
11,553 observations. The results are similar to the
findings for the full sample. Young firms as well as
large firms actively engage in entrepreneurial spawn-
ing. Moreover, successful firms spawn fewer ventures.
The only difference to the full sample models is that
just one performance variable has a significantly
negative coefficient (ROA). Sales Growth turns insig-
nificant. High tech firms that pay higher average wages
also have higher spawning rates.
In a second robustness check we drop the control
group of non-spawning firms and re-run the regres-
sions for the subsample of spawning firms. All results
remain robust. We also re-run the regressions for the
subsample of 413 firms that spawn taxable ventures. It
was mentioned before that these firms have spawned
the 438 ventures we consider in the next part of our
empirical analysis. The results are still robust: large
and less successful firms have higher spawning rates.21
As a last robustness check, we estimate probit models
for the likelihood of being a spawning firm. The results
are in line with previous findings and can be found in
Appendix 1.
Furthermore, we re-run the regressions for the
spawning rate in t ? 1 and t ? 2. While the results for
t ? 1 are very similar to the findings for the contem-
poraneous regressions the estimated coefficients for
the firm characteristics in the regression t ? 2 are
much lower and some regressors turn insignificant.
This is not surprising since one would expect that
employees react on recent developments within the
firm when deciding to leave for entrepreneurship. The
results are available from the authors upon request.
4.1.1 Panel models
The cross sectional regression results have shown that
large firms as well as firms with unfavorable sales
growth and ROA have higher spawning rates than
successful firms. Since cross-sectional results do not
take into account that unobserved firm heterogeneity
(due to differences in management skills, entrepre-
neurial climate within the firm, etc.) could drive
spawning rates as well, we also estimate panel models
with firm fixed effects. More specifically, we estimate
fixed effects Poisson models as introduced by Haus-
man et al. (1984). Gourieroux et al. (1984) have shown
that the Poisson estimator is consistent for panel data
even if the dependent variable does not truly follow a
Poisson-distribution as long as the mean specification
is correct. In addition, previous research has shown
that a significant portion of the overdispersion is
accounted for if one allows for random or fixed
disturbances (Hausman et al. 1984). The fixed effects
in our Poisson model then control for some of the
overdispersion in the data. If fully robust standard
errors are calculated, the fixed effects Poisson models
even provide protection against any residual overdis-
persion. Hence, we prefer Poisson estimators over
negative binomial models for our panel data models.
Compared to the negative binomial panel models, this
Table 4 Marginal effects for Table 3
Variables ZI negative Binomiala Negative binomial ZI negative binomiala Negative binomial Tobit model
Full sample High tech Full sample High tech
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Age -0.0009*** -0.0006*** -0.0006** -0.0006** -0.0003 ** -0.0002*
Size 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.01**
ROA -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.02**
Sales Growth -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.01*** 0.002
Average Wage 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.03**
*** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%), respectively
a The inflation equation includes the same variables as the logit equation (Coefficient estimates are not reported)
20 We use the official Eurostat classification to identify high
tech industries (Felix 2006).
21 The regression results are available from the authors on
request.
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ensures that no assumption regarding the functional
form of the variance term is necessary since one would
have to cope with inconsistent estimates if this
assumption fails.
Model 7 in Table 5 reports the estimates of the fixed
effects quasi maximum likelihood Poisson model for
our full sample. As before, large firms have high rates
of entrepreneurial spawning, which is unsurprising
given that more people work there. To this end, we
confirm this finding by estimating panel Tobit models
in which the dependent variable is normalized by total
assets. The results in Model 9 reveal that large firms
still have high spawning rates. Although the count data
results show that spawning is unrelated to sales
growth, a highly significant and negative effect is
found for ROA. Hence, it can be concluded that
employees do not leave firms that are well performing,
but instead when firm performance (in terms of ROA)
is low. Most employees decide to create their own
ventures and pursue entrepreneurial opportunities
outside the firm when the opportunity costs for
remaining employed are diminished (also see Gom-
pers et al. 2005; Hyytinen and Maliranta 2008;
Eriksson and Kuhn 2006). The final result of Model
7 shows that firms paying high average wages also
have higher spawning levels.
Running the fixed effects quasi-maximum likeli-
hood Poisson regressions (Model 8) as well as the
Tobit models (Model 10) for a subset of high tech
firms, reveals similar results. Note that the predicted
marginal effects decrease if firm-specific unobserv-
able effects are taken into account (Table 6).
In summary, it can be said that controlling for
unobserved firm heterogeneity does not change the
answers to our two research questions regarding the
effect of firm size and performance on spawning rates.22
4.2 Providing a link between venture performance
and spawner characteristics
The entrepreneurship literature remains quiet when it
comes to scrutinizing if the performance of spawned
ventures is affected by their origin. To shed some light
on this question, we run OLS regressions with the
performance of the spawned ventures as the dependent
variable (in terms of V_ROA and V_OROA) and
venture and spawner characteristics as independent
variables. Models 11 and 13 in Table 7 only regress
the dependent variables on venture characteristics. In
Models 12 and 14, we add the characteristics of the
ventures’ former employers.23
The results of Model 12 reveal that venture size has
a positive impact on performance. Surprisingly, all
other venture characteristics are insignificant. Regard-
ing the spawning firms’ characteristics, it can be seen
that the better the performance of the spawning
companies (in terms of ROA), the better the perfor-
mance of the ventures (cf. Franco and Filson 2006, and
the references within Klepper 2007). This result
supports our third research question claiming that the
financial success of the parent firms influences the
financial success of the spawned ventures. One
interpretation of this finding could be that venture
founders who worked at such firms were able to access
and exploit more valuable knowledge, possibly result-
ing in increased venture performance. An alternative
explanation is provided by Klepper (2007) and
Chatterji (2009). They argue that better firms have
better employees who are more likely to start new
ventures, which also perform better. Chatterji (2009)
calls this the ‘‘good people work for good firms’’
explanation. We try to control for this objection by
including average wage as a proxy for the skill level of
the spawning firms’ employees in our regressions.
Running the same regressions for our second
performance variable (V_OROA) yields similar
results. Size is the only venture characteristic that
has a significant and positive effect on performance.
Most importantly, however, it can still be shown that
ventures of successful spawning firms (in terms of
ROA) turn out to be successful as well, lending
support to our third research question.24
Given that successful firms spawn few (as was
discussed in the previous subsection) but profitable
ventures, it can be concluded that employees of such
22 In addition we ran cross-sectional OLS and fixed effects
models. The results are similar to what we find for the count data
and Tobit models. Results are available from the authors upon
request.
23 Note that we lose some observations for these regressions
(Models 12–14) as we add the sales growth of the spawning
firms, which costs us one year by definition of the measure. The
regression results for Models 11–13 are robust if the reduced
sample of Models 12–14 is used.
24 The result remains robust when we use OROA instead of
ROA as a measure for the financial success of the spawning firm.
Results are available from the authors upon request.
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firms are more reluctant to quit and create new
ventures than employees of struggling companies.
Working for a successful firm increases the opportu-
nity costs of leaving so that employees only opt for the
pursuit of entrepreneurial opportunities if the expected
returns are high enough. For this reason, Eriksson and
Kuhn (2006) describe ventures that have been
spawned by profitable firms to be pulled by the
market. This argument is in line with the superior
performance of ventures spawned by successful firms
as was just described.
5 Conclusion
The employment history of entrepreneurs has attracted
the interest of academic scholars in recent years.
Several studies argue that entrepreneurs became
inspired by business ideas they came across at their
previous employers (Klepper 2001; Agarwal et al.
2004; Klepper and Sleeper 2005; Cassiman and Ueda
2006; Hyytinen and Maliranta 2008). This process, by
which former employees become entrepreneurs and
found new ventures, is known as entrepreneurial
Table 5 Panel models on the annual Spawning Rate for the full sample and the high tech subsample
Parameter Dependent variable: Spawning Rate Dependent variable: Spawning
Rate/total assets
QML panel Poisson Panel Tobit
Sample Full sample High tech
sample
Full sample High tech
sample
Variables Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Size * (1000) 0.34*** 0.41*** 0.02** 5.01***
(0.04) (0.13) (0.01) (0.72)
ROA * (100) -0.49*** -0.96*** -0.16*** -1.91***
(0.10) (0.23) (0.01) (0.59)
Sales Growth * (100) 0.03 0.12 -0.14** 0.52
(0.04) (0.11) (0.01) (0.37)
Age * (1000) -0.004 0.004 -0.04*** 0.12
(0.005) (0.03) (0.002) (0.12)
Average Wage * (100) 0.82*** 0.86*** 0.13*** 0.94***
(0.11) (0.27) (0.005) (0.33)
Intercept * (100) – – -0.31*** -13.9***
– – (0.01) (0.88)
Test of joint significance
of year dummies, v2(4)
2146.41*** 217.33*** 2024.81*** 141.17***
Log-likelihood -13638.57 -1115.84 23442.82 322.12
Observations 33768 2923 33768 2923
Table 6 Marginal effects for Table 5
Variables QML panel Poisson QML panel Poisson Panel Tobit
Full sample High Tech Full sample High Tech
Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Age * (1000) -0.004 -0.0004 -0.00004*** 0.0001
Size * (1000) 0.34*** 0.41*** 0.00002** 0.005***
ROA * (100) -0.49*** -0.96*** -0.002*** -0.02***
Sales Growth * (100) 0.03 0.12 -0.0001** 0.005
Average Wage * (100) 0.82*** 0.86*** 0.001*** 0.009***
*** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%), respectively
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Table 7 OLS results on the ventures’ performance for the full sample
Variables Dependent variable: V_ROA Dependent variable: V_OROA
Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14
V_Size 0.02** 0.03** 0.02** 0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
V_Age * (100) 0.02 -0.42 -0.31 -0.83
(0.71) (1.33) (0.72) (1.21)
V_Average Wage * (100)a -0.04 0.01 0.02 0.04
(0.03) (0.04) (3.12) (0.04)
V_Founding Team -0.11* -0.07 -0.07 -0.07
(0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.07)
Size * (100) – 0.07 – 0.04
– (0.42) – (0.43)
ROA – 0.19** – 0.16**
– (0.09) – (0.08)
Sales Growth – -0.04 – -0.06
– (0.06) – (0.05)
Age * (100) – 0.03 – 0.005
– (0.21) – (0.11)
Young – 0.02 – 0.02
– (0.04) – (0.03)
Old – -0.04 – 0.04
– (0.12) – (0.07)
Average Wage * (10) – -0.02 – 0.02
– (0.45) – (0.39)
Focused – 0.02 – 0.02
– (0.06) – (0.06)
Same Industry – 0.03 – 0.03
– (0.03) – (0.03)
Intercept -0.11 -0.16 -0.06 -0.12
(0.07) (0.12) (0.06) (0.11)
R2 0.04 0.11 0.03 0.12
Test of joint significance of the venture
foundation year dummies, v2(5)
1.23 1.45 1.28 1.27
Test of joint significance of the venture
industry dummies, v2(5)
0.51 0.77 0.51 0.97
Test of joint significance of the venture
region dummies, v2(3)
0.67 0.26 0.49 0.11
Test of joint significance of the year
dummies, v2(5)
– 1.12 – 1.05
Test of joint significance of the spawner
industry dummies, v2(5)
– 1.83 – 1.81
Test of joint significance of the spawner
region dummies, v2(3)
– 1.01 – 1.05
Observations 637 426 637 426
Notes: Clustered standard errors at the firm lever are in parentheses; *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%),
respectively
a Only the coefficient and standard error of V_Average Wage in Model 12 have been multiplied by 100
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spawning. Previous literature has already identified
firm size and performance as important characteristics
influencing the rate at which new ventures are
spawned. The question if these spawning firm char-
acteristics can also influence the financial success of
new ventures, however, remains unanswered by
existing studies. This paper provides a first empirical
investigation of this research gap. In particular, we are
interested in the question if successful firms spawn
financially successful ventures.
Our analysis is based on the official employee–
employer data sets of Statistics Netherlands. These data
sets allow us to identify all spawning firms along with
the newly created ventures. Based on this information
we investigate three related questions. First, we follow
previous studies and determine the effect of firm size
and performance on the rate at which new ventures are
spawned. As an answer to our first two research
questions, the results show that large firms as well as
firms lacking a good financial performance are the most
active spawners. The former finding is in accordance
with an earlier study by Gompers et al. (2005).
Employees seem to create new ventures because they
are frustrated that the large firms for which they work
are unable or unwilling to fund their entrepreneurial
ideas. Our second finding that there is a negative
relationship between firm performance and spawning
rate is a consistent finding throughout most studies (cf.
Eriksson and Kuhn 2006; Hyytinen and Maliranta
2008; Wagner 2004). Employees found their own
ventures if the performance of their employers drop and
the rents from staying at the firm are reduced (cf.
Eriksson and Kuhn 2006; Hyytinen and Maliranta
2008; Wagner 2004). This suggests that most new
ventures are rather ‘‘pushed’’ by crises at the spawning
firms (e.g. bad performances) and not ‘‘pulled’’ by the
market or the wish to follow a business idea indepen-
dently (Eriksson and Kuhn 2006).
The second part of our analysis answers the
research question if the financial performance of
entrepreneurial ventures is affected by the character-
istics of their spawning companies. Specifically, we
are interested in examining the relationship between
the ventures’ performance and the spawning firms’
performance. We find, in accordance with our research
question, that firms exhibiting a good performance
also spawn successful ventures. A possible explana-
tion for this finding is that well performing companies
possess valuable and distinct knowledge, which their
employees are able to exploit for founding and running
successful ventures (Klepper 2009; Agarwal et al.
2004; Franco and Filson 2006; Eriksson and Kuhn
2006). In fact, founders of pulled ventures not only
learned important knowledge about technologies
(Klepper and Sleeper 2005; Agarwal et al. 2004),
markets (Jovanovic 1982; Agarwal et al. 2004) and
organizational processes (Buenstorf 2009) from their
previous employers, but also established important
contacts with suppliers and customers, which they can
now take advantage of (Helfat and Lieberman 2002).
Finally, our analysis suggests that well performing
firms spawn few but successful ventures. It seems that
employees of such firms are more reluctant to quit and
create new ventures than employees of struggling
companies. In the former case, the opportunity costs of
leaving are higher so that employees are only deciding
to pursue entrepreneurial opportunities if the expected
returns are high enough. This result is consistent with
the superior performance of ventures spawned by
successful firms as depicted before.
Our findings have important implications. In par-
ticular, they suggest that large firms, which have high
spawning rates, might want to encourage the internal
pursuit of entrepreneurial ideas if employees should be
persuaded to stay. One way to do so would be the
creation of corporate ventures (CVs) in which employ-
ees’ entrepreneurial ideas are implemented. Corporate
ventures are autonomous or semi-autonomous firms
that reside within the organizational domains of their
founding companies. An advantage of corporate ven-
tures is that they can operate rather independently but
still rely on the resources of their corporate sponsors
(Hill and Rothaermel 2003; Sharma and Chrisman
1999). Recent research has shown that these specific
characteristics make corporate ventures do well at
generating radically new innovations (Czarnitzki et al.
2010). Cassiman and Ueda (2006) argue, however, that
firms have a limited capacity for corporate venturing.
This means that not all entrepreneurial ideas can be
capitalized on. Firms have to consider the returns from
an employee’s innovation against both cannibalization
effects and the option value of waiting for better
projects in the future. Hence, corporate venturing is
only feasible to a certain extent.
Our study is not free of limitations. First of all, we are
not able to measure directly if venture founders have
learned something from their previous employers. We
can only conclude indirectly that employees of better
926 J. M. H. Dick et al.
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performing firms must have learned valuable knowl-
edge that facilitates the creation of successful ventures.
Previous studies could state more specifically if
employees have inherited knowledge from their previ-
ous employers (Agarwal et al. 2004; Franco and Filson
2006). In fact, both studies were able to distinguish
between different knowledge types. The reason is that
the authors can make use of specific knowledge
measures that are only applicable to the disk drive
industry. Agarwal et al. (2004), for instance, use these
industry specific knowledge measures to approximate
technical knowledge and marketing knowledge. Also
Chatterji (2009) accounts for technical knowledge in
his empirical analysis on the medical device industry
and confirms the importance of marketing knowledge
by conducting interviews with venture founders. Such
detailed information, however, come at a cost as the
data samples of these studies are restricted to a certain
industry. While lacking some of the detailed informa-
tion used in prior research, our study has the advantage
that it is based on samples that cover the whole Dutch
manufacturing and service industries.
Second, our analysis relies on an unbalanced
sample of spawned ventures so that we cannot use
growth measures to further test the robustness of our
results. Information on the exit dates of the ventures is
also missing since our panel is too short to observe
many firm exits. Accordingly, a survival analysis
cannot be performed either. Third, we lack informa-
tion on the innovativeness of the last employers and
the spawned ventures. Since we have only access to
anonymized data sets at Statistics Netherlands and
cannot observe firm names, we are not able to link
publicly available patent records to our ventures and
spawning firms.
A possible venue for future research would be to
assess if the performance of the spawning companies
worsens after their entrepreneurial employees leave to
found new ventures. In this context, it would be
interesting to obtain more information on the employ-
ment history of the spawned employees. What kind of
positions did they hold at their previous employers? Is
venture performance dependent on how long they
worked for the spawning companies?
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License which
permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction
in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are
credited.
Appendix 1
Whereas Sect. 4.1 shed light on the effect of, inter alia,
firm size and performance on a firm’s rate of
entrepreneurial spawning, we now analyze the attri-
butes that determine whether firms spawn at all. A
dummy variable, equaling one if a firm spawns at least
one venture and zero otherwise (Spawner), was
created to address this question.
Overall, the probit regressions in Table 8 largely
support the key results from Sect. 4.1 in the sense that
those firms displaying a high spawning rate are also
Table 8 Probit regression results on being a spawner for the
full sample and the high tech subsample
Variables Dependent variable: Spawner
(1/0)



















Test of joint significance
of year dummies, v2(4)
429.23*** 36.94***
Test of joint significance
of industry dummies, v2(33)
535.84*** 17.78**,a
Test of joint significance




Notes: Clustered standard errors are at the firm level are in
parentheses; *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1%
(5%, 10%), respectively
a Test of joint significance of industry dummies, v2(8)
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the ones that are most likely to spawn at least one
entrepreneurial venture. Large firms, young firms and
firms with an inferior performance have both a high
spawning rate and a high likelihood of spawning at
least one new venture. The results remain robust if one
only considers the subsample of high tech firms
(Model 16). The main difference to the results from
Sect. 4.1 lies in the fact that focused firms (Focused),
extremely young firms (Young) and old companies
(Old) are more likely to spawn new ventures, although
these characteristics had no impact on spawning rates.
Appendix 2
See Tables 9, 10, 11 and 12.
Table 9 Spawning percentage of firms





















2 Manufacture of textiles 127 103




4 Manufacture of leather
and leather products
26 22
5 Manufacture of wood
and wood products
181 158


























































18 Recycling 31 28
19 Electricity, gas and
water supply
43 19
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